Federal Reserve : Central bank cooperation by Vanessa Sumo
I
n the midst of the credit market
turmoil last year, the world’s
major central banks got together
in a surprise move to help ease the 
liquidity squeeze. Central banks were
compelled to act — not alone but in a
coordinated fashion — because of the
international nature of events in 
the markets. Although critics of 
this synchronized action say that it
does not address the underlying 
reason why market participants fret
about lending, their move was consid-
ered far less controversial than past
episodes of central bank cooperation.
One well-known controversial
example was when Britain returned 
to the gold standard after World 
War I. Britain struggled for many
years to keep a
fixed rate of ex-
change between
gold and sterling.
Part of the prob-
lem was how to
address a weak
domestic econo-
my and at the
same time main-
tain this peg. 
If the Bank of
England eased
monetary policy




out of the coun-
try and complicate the task of
defending the peg. Fortunately for
Britain, New York Fed President
Benjamin Strong’s close friendship
with Bank of England Governor
Montagu Norman made Strong sym-
pathetic to Britain’s economic woes.
Strong was instrumental in the
Fed’s decision to reduce interest rates
in the fall of 1927 supposedly to help
Britain. Lower interest rates in the
United States allowed Britain to avoid
raising its own interest rate, which
would have been counterproductive
for its slumping economy. At the same
time, the rate cut took some pressure
off of Britain’s gold peg, because a
wider difference between British and
U.S. interest rates encouraged gold
flows to Britain.
But the Fed’s action also meant
that credit conditions would be 
looser in the United States. Indeed,
President Herbert Hoover would later
blame Strong and Fed policies at that
time for the stock market boom 
and the eventual bust of 1929, and 
subsequently the Great Depression.
Whether this instance of one central
bank helping out another actually 
led to disastrous results is unclear.
(Others have argued that the 
Fed’s decision to expand monetary 
policy was taken mainly for domestic 
reasons, because of concerns that a
rise in interest rates in Britain would
depress demand for U.S. exports.)
Central banks cooperate to achieve
common goals. This can be accom-
plished by sharing information,
jointly setting standards, collectively
intervening in a financial crisis, and
coordinating exchange rates and 
monetary policy. However, cooperat-
ing can be complicated, especially if
central banks engage in a deeper form
of cooperation. For instance, coordi-
nating exchange rates requires
following a policy that may be incon-
sistent with a country’s domestic
economic conditions. A central bank
will then have to weigh the costs of
giving up its independence and influ-
ence over the economy against the
benefits of cooperation.  
But aside from this difficulty, 
tightly linked capital markets and
favorable changes in the way central
banks conduct monetary policy have
cast some doubt on whether coopera-





a long history of
working together,
but is there still
scope for future
cooperation?
They speak the same language: Bank 
of England Governor Mervyn King,
left, talks with former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,
center, and European Central Bank
President Jean-Claude Trichet, right,
at a G20 finance ministers and 
central bank heads meeting 






















Stion should continue in the future. 
“If central banks are focused 
on domestic price stability, and if 
domestic financial stability is assured
by adequate governance and regu-
latory standards (albeit likely to be
internationally negotiated), what 
further role is there for international
cooperation?” asked William White,
an economist at the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) at
a 2005 BIS conference on central
bank cooperation. “Globalized”
financial and goods markets might
imply that coordination is not 
only beneficial but also necessary 
to manage spillovers of a country’s
policies on others. However, 
if central banks keep their 
domestic affairs in order, then 
the rationale for international
cooperation is weaker. 
Ways to Work Together
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve
announced an abrupt change in oper-
ating procedures to fight rapidly rising
inflation in the United States. Interest
rates shot up and were kept at very
high levels, even if that meant risking a
recession. The Fed’s efforts eventually
tamed inflation, but not without
affecting economies abroad. Latin
American countries, in particular, had
borrowed heavily from international
creditors at floating interest rates. So
when rates in the United States (and
Europe) went up, Latin American
countries struggled to pay their debt.
Moreover, demand for their exports
weakened as the United States and
other countries slipped into a reces-
sion, which crippled their ability to
earn much-needed foreign currency.
Latin America’s debt crisis was
worrying because some of the world’s
biggest banks had lent heavily to these
countries and were not sufficiently
capitalized to cover these exposures.
The situation had the potential to
destabilize the world’s financial sys-
tem. So when the crisis erupted in
Mexico in August 1982, the Federal
Reserve and the Japanese and
European central banks moved swiftly
to offer a “bridge” loan of $1.85 billion
to help Mexico until it reached an
agreement with the International
Monetary Fund to sort out its financial
problems. “We didn’t have to spend a
lot of time explaining to each other
the nature of the emergency,” wrote
Paul Volcker, chairman of the Federal
Reserve from 1979 to 1987, in a book
that he co-wrote on international
monetary affairs.
Central banks have banded together
in similar ways in the past. They coop-
erated to lend support to Mexico in its
1982 financial crisis. In December
2007, central banks simultaneously
injected liquidity in the banking 
system when banks became increas-
ingly cautious in the interbank credit
market. Central banks have also 
chosen to collectively intervene in 
currency crises, such as the various
efforts to save the gold standard and
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange
rate system.
But cooperation does not always
involve a “rescue.” The experience in
Latin America in the early 1980s, for
instance, highlighted the need to set
capital adequacy standards for banks
worldwide. Banks serve an important
economic role and often take on a high
degree of leverage to carry out that
role. Banks also have privileged access
to central bank funds and their
deposits are federally insured.
Consequently, there is a strong need to
make sure that banks aren’t taking on
too much risk. A global convergence 
of such standards is desirable because
the collapse of a number of financial
institutions could affect other inter-
mediaries throughout the world. And
as banks increasingly compete interna-
tionally, it is important that they face
regulatory environments which aren’t
too different.
This common recognition drove
central banks and financial supervisors
of industrialized countries to write and
adopt the 1988 Basel Accord. It sets
forth guidelines to measure the mini-
mum amount of capital that banks
ought to have in relation to the risk
they carry. Despite criticisms and
shortcomings, the Basel Accord is
widely viewed as having achieved
its purpose of promoting more
consistent regulation across coun-
tries. The implementation of the
second Basel Accord, which takes
into account the complexity of the
structure and practices of banking
and financial markets today, is now
under way. 
But perhaps the easiest form of
cooperation is in sharing informa-
tion that central bankers can use to
make policy. Indeed, this is what Beth
Simmons of Harvard University called
“shallow cooperation” at the BIS 
conference. Its importance, however,
should not be understated. Providing
each other with quality and timely
economic and financial data allows
central bankers to compare, assess,
and discuss how changing conditions
can potentially affect the economy at
home. Simmons says that central
banks can also share information by
“showing one’s hand” — that is, by
communicating policy preferences
and policy choices which may soon be
implemented. And it also helps when
central bankers talk to each other
about their understanding of how the
economic world works, knowing that
without basic agreement, central
banks would be less effective at
improving their joint welfare. 
From Shallow to Deep 
Exchange rate and monetary policy
coordination is the most ambitious
form of collaboration, because it
imposes constraints on a monetary
authority’s autonomy. That it requires
the highest level of commitment is
probably why it is also most prone 
to failure.
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If central banks keep their
domestic affairs in order,
then the rationale 
for international 
cooperation is weaker.When two countries fix their
exchange rates, central bankers essen-
tially give up their power to guide the
economy using monetary policy. For
instance, if a central bank wished to
expand the money supply in response
to high unemployment, then it would
have to eventually sell foreign reserves
to maintain the exchange rate. But
that would reverse the expansion.
Similarly, if the United States experi-
enced high inflation, then countries
which have a fixed exchange rate with
the dollar would be effectively import-
ing that inflation. Central banks in the
other countries would have to (and in
fact, do) inflate their economies to
keep the exchange rate constant. 
The fixed exchange rate regime
under the Bretton Woods agreement
is an example of this type of coopera-
tion. Signed in 1944, the world’s
industrialized countries agreed to fix
their exchange rate to the dollar, while
the United States would peg the dollar
to gold. Fixing exchange rates was
thought to be an effective way of
imposing monetary discipline. No
central bank would be able to pursue
excessive monetary expansion without
breaking the peg. It was also believed
to be beneficial to international trade
as well as to prevent speculators from
destabilizing currencies. However, the
demands of such a regime eventually
put a strain on this cooperation, 
particularly in the late 1960s, when
accelerating inflation in the United
States made it difficult for Germany
and other countries to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate to the dollar. 
The system eventually collapsed in 
the early 1970s. 
There were also attempts to actively
intervene in the exchange rate market
after the Bretton Woods era. One
rather notorious case involved the
efforts of some central banks to 
weaken what was thought to be an
overvalued dollar in the 1980s.
America’s brittle economy and its
large and growing trade deficit was a
concern not only for the United States
but also for its trading partners. 
Strong protectionist pressures to 
discourage imports were building in
Congress at that time, and many
feared that lawmakers might give in to
such demands. To avoid this 
possibility, U.S. Treasury Secretary
James Baker brought together finance
ministers and central bankers of the
group of five industrial countries 
(G-5), which included the United
States, West Germany, Japan, France,
and the United Kingdom. 
In a secret meeting at New York
City’s Plaza Hotel in September 1985,
the G-5 voiced concerns that the large
external imbalances and the threat of
protectionism “could lead to mutually
destructive retaliation with serious
damage to the world economy.” 
They agreed that “exchange rates
should play a role in adjusting external
imbalances” and that they would
“stand ready to cooperate more closely
to encourage this [appreciation of
other currencies against the dollar]
when to do so would be helpful.” 
A weaker dollar would improve the
U.S. trade balance and help lift the 
economy out of a recession, which
would in turn increase demand in 
the long run for other countries’
exports. Moreover, it would head 
off the possibility of protectionist
measures that might trigger similar
policy responses from other countries. 
A concerted effort followed to sell 
dollars in the foreign exchange 
market. The dollar fell sharply
throughout 1986.
Following the Plaza Accord,
Volcker was under pressure to lower
interest rates to prop up the domestic
economy. Indeed, the Reagan adminis-
tration had made known its desire for
lower interest rates. But Volcker 
hesitated to move in this direction for
fear of a runaway decline in the value
of the dollar. He finally agreed to 
lower interest rates, but only if he
could get the German and Japanese
central banks to likewise lower their
rates, so that the difference between
the domestic and foreign return on 
capital, which determines the flows 
of funds and therefore the exchange
rate, would remain the same. The 
central banks agreed and the coordina-
tion was carried out in March and
April of 1986. Such cooperation would
be highly unusual today. 
However, the continued fall in the
value of the dollar started to worry
other countries, particularly Japan
with its export-driven economy. In a
meeting at the Louvre in Paris in
February 1987, finance ministers and
central bankers of the Plaza Accord
group (plus Canada) agreed that 
“further substantial exchange rate
shifts among their currencies could
damage growth and adjustment
prospects in their countries.” Again,
there was concerted exchange rate
intervention, but this time in the
other direction. Central banks bought
dollars and sold local currency, which
effectively increased the domestic
supply of money. Some analysts say
that Japan’s monetary easing, follow-
ing these controversial episodes of
cooperation, contributed to the 
financial and real estate bubble that
plagued the country in the late 1980s.
Cooperation and Its Discontents
Arguments for coordination are often
made in reference to situations like a
world shock that hit all countries 
(an oil price spike, for instance). 
Acentral bank might respond by tight-
ening monetary policy to prevent a
rise in the overall price level. Higher
interest rates would dampen demand
for domestic goods, and bring about 
a stronger currency that would make
imports cheaper and keep prices low. 
If a neighboring central bank, 
however, follows a similar strategy,
then the exchange rate between the
two countries’ currencies will stay
more or less the same. If each of the
central banks responds with even
more tightening to get the desired
exchange rate appreciation, then they
would eventually succeed in bringing
down inflation, but only at a high cost
in terms of output. Had the two 
countries coordinated their actions
and agreed not to tighten as much,
then inflation would be stabilized and
the reduction in output and employ-
ment would not be as high. Therefore,
countries would be better off if central
banks coordinated monetary policy.
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though, is incomplete. In a 1985 paper,
Harvard University economist
Kenneth Rogoff notes that such 
monetary policy cooperation can also
be counterproductive if it exacerbates
the central banks’ credibility problem;
that is, the temptation to inflate the
economy in order to increase employ-
ment. When a central bank expands
monetary policy, interest rates fall 
and the exchange rate depreciates. 
A weaker currency makes imports
more expensive and causes price levels
to go up, which provides an automatic
check on a central bank that is also
concerned about inflation. 
But if two countries coordinate
their monetary expansion, then the
exchange rate between their curren-
cies will not change. This increases a
central bank’s incentive to give in 
to the temptation of inflating the
economy because of the greater effect
on employment. However, because
workers anticipate this incentive to
inflate, they will demand higher wages.
The result is a higher long-run 
inflation rate than if countries acted
unilaterally. Thus, cooperation can
only produce a better outcome if 
central banks can credibly suppress
these inflationary impulses. 
During the past few decades, 
central banks of industrialized 
countries have made substantial
progress in mitigating the commit-
ment problem in monetary policy, says
Rogoff. Moreover, goods and financial
markets are now more tightly linked
than ever. Both factors seem to 
suggest that countries could benefit
substantially from monetary policy
coordination. 
However, Rogoff, in a 2002 paper
with economist Maurice Obstfeld of
the University of California, Berkeley,
finds that on the contrary “this lack of
coordination may not always be a 
big problem.” The argument for 
cooperation in the face of world
shocks actually weakens when the
monetary authority can credibly com-
mit to keeping prices stable, because
they can do so successfully without
imposing a large cost on output and
employment. When that happens, 
the benefit of cooperation may be
much smaller.
With respect to country-specific
shocks, or shocks that hit one country
but not another, central bank coopera-
tion may also be unnecessary as capital
markets become more integrated.
Central bankers may not need to be
called upon to sort out shocks of this
nature, since countries can borrow
from each other through financial
markets to smooth consumption when
times are tough. Hence, the case for
monetary policy cooperation may be
much weaker.
The Future of Cooperation
Although central bank cooperation
has gone through many ups and 
downs over the last century, the 
broader trend that economist Barry
Eichengreen of the University of
California, Berkeley, sees is that 
cooperation has grown. Advances in
communication and transportation
technology have reduced the costs of
sharing information, and institutions
like the BIS have provided a venue to
regularly exchange information and
expertise concerning monetary policy. 
Perhaps more important, coopera-
tion has grown over time because
monetary policymakers now speak the
same language. “One can make com-
pelling arguments that the rise of a
common monetary policy paradigm —
namely, the belief that independent
central banks should target low and
stable rates of inflation and pursue
other objectives to the extent that
they do not conflict with this core
mandate — is a key explanation for
their ability to cooperate,” said
Eichengreen at the BIS conference.
He cites the experience of monetary
policy coordination among the
European Union group of central
banks — the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB) — which
would have been more difficult had
they not agreed on the primary 
objectives of low and stable inflation.
Eichengreen also notes the success 
of central banks and regulators in
establishing and adopting capital 
adequacy rules for banks, reflecting a
common recognition of a market-led
financial system.
But while central banks that under-
stand each other may have a greater
ability to work together, Rogoff and
Obstfeld’s finding suggests that 
countries may be just as well-off 
if central banks don’t cooperate, as
long as they follow good policies to
ensure price and financial stability.
This is because in recent decades,
countries can increasingly depend 
on their own abilities to fight inflation
without a costly impact on output, 
and on internationally integrated 
capital markets to insure themselves
against country-specific shocks.
Even so, the ability to follow sound
policies has been helped along by the
exchange of information and views
between central banks, and by harmo-
nized standards — especially with
respect to financial stability — that 
these monetary authorities helped to
establish. Thus, the future may be
brighter for these types of coopera-
tion, but less so for exchange rate and
monetary policy coordination.  RF
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